Wednesday, January 02, 2008

The Need for a Client View of Context-Independent Symbols 

In the paper Interactively converging on context-sensitive representations: A solution to the frame problem by Robert M. French and Patrick Anselme, the authors describe a robotic simulation of context-sensitive representations:
"Agre and Chapman (1987) developed a simulation, Pengi, in which an agent — a penguin — makes use of context-dependent representations in order to avoid being attacked, in this case, by a bee. Piles of ice cubes are used to allow Pengi to protect himself from being stung by the bee. In addition, Pengi can fight back against the bee by means of a well-placed kick to any ice cube that the bee happens to be directly behind. As for the bee, it has two means to kill the penguin: either by striking an ice cube that Pengi is hiding behind or by stinging the penguin. Space does not allow a full development here of the strategies that the penguin can adopt, nor of his actual sensori-motor abilities (for a detailed description, see Agre, 1997). It is, however, important to note that the penguin has well-developed attentional capabilities that allow him to focus on the salient factors of the situation in which he finds himself.

In the Pengi simulation, all events are contextually determined. There are not context-independent representations, like “ice-cube wall” or even “bee.” The penguin’s representations are, to use Agre’s term, deictic, meaning that they depend on the circumstances in which they are used. Pengi’s representations take the form of the-wall-behind-which-I-will-hide or the-bee-I-want-to-kill (Agre, 1997, p. 267). These representations do not describe context-independent entities; rather they describe some aspect of the environment that is in a particular relation to the agent at a particular moment in time. In other words, rather than a context-independent “bee” representation, the system produces a representation for a particular bee in a particular place at a particular time. The Pengi model avoids the frame problem because the agent is manipulating context-sensitive representations for “bee” that include various salient aspects of situation at hand."

I suspect that biological agents show this kind of continuous context-sensitivity in their sense of the referents of symbols. As the "Great Global Graph" of linked data on the web grows, our automated agents will need to show this kind of selectivity as well. But rather than over-use the word "context", perhaps a better term here would be "personalization". So each clients view of the GGG, the world wide graph of data, will be different, skewed towards the needs of that client. This will probably be done by a collaboration between new kinds of search agents and each client themselves.

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Prior Art

Socrates

"We are in the habit, I take it, of positing a single idea or form in the case of the various multiplicities to which we give the same name. Do you not understand?" "I do." "In the present case, then, let us take any multiplicity you please; for example, there are many couches and tables." "Of course." "But these utensils imply, I suppose, only two ideas or forms, one of a couch and one of a table." "Yes." "And are we not also in the habit of saying that the craftsman who produces either of them fixes his eyes on the idea or form, and so makes in the one case the couches and in the other the tables that we use, and similarly of other things? For surely no craftsman makes the idea itself. How could he?" "By no means."
Plato, Republic X, page 596a


David Hume

"This convention is not of the nature of a promise: For even promises themselves, as we shall see afterwards, arise from human conventions. It is only a general sense of common interest; which sense all the members of the society express to one another, and which induces them to regulate their conduct by certain rules. I observe, that it will be for my interest to leave another in the possession of his goods, provided he will act in the same manner with regard to me. He is sensible of a like interest in the regulation of his conduct. When this common sense of interest is mutually expressed, and is known to both, it produces a suitable resolution and behaviour. And this may properly enough be called a convention or agreement betwixt us, though without the interposition of a promise; since the actions of each of us have a reference to those of the other, and are performed upon the supposition, that something is to be performed on the other part. Two men, who pull the oars of a boat, do it by an agreement or convention, though they have never given promises to each other. Nor is the rule concerning the stability of possession the less derived from human conventions, that it arises gradually, and acquires force by a slow progression, and. by our repeated experience of the inconveniences of transgressing it. On the contrary, this experience assures us still more, that the sense of interest has become common to all our fellows, and gives us a confidence of the future regularity of their conduct: And it is only on the expectation of this, that our moderation and abstinence are founded. In like manner are languages gradually established by human conventions without any promise. ..." - A Treatise of Human Nature, Chapter 74 by David Hume


John Locke

"...Semeiotike, or the doctrine of signs; the most usual whereof being words, it is aptly enough termed also Logike, logic: the business whereof is to consider the nature of signs, the mind makes use of for the understanding of things, or conveying its knowledge to others. For, since the things the mind contemplates are none of them, besides itself, present to the understanding, it is necessary that something else, as a sign or representation of the thing it considers, should be present to it: and these are ideas. And because the scene of ideas that makes one man's thoughts cannot be laid open to the immediate view of another, nor laid up anywhere but in the memory, a no very sure repository: therefore to communicate our thoughts to one another, as well as record them for our own use, signs of our ideas are also necessary: those which men have found most convenient, and therefore generally make use of, are articulate sounds. The consideration, then, of ideas and words as the great instruments of knowledge, makes no despicable part of their contemplation who would take a view of human knowledge in the whole extent of it. And perhaps if they were distinctly weighed, and duly considered, they would afford us another sort of logic and critic, than what we have been hitherto acquainted with." - AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING by John Locke 1690